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The chapters of this dissertation have tried, in distinct ways, to provide small peeks at the role 
of autonomy, legality and pluralism in EU law and the EU legal system. The choice for a 
dissertation based on separate articles – instead of a monograph-based approach – results in a 
rather eclectic compilation. The seven chapters which comprise the main body of this thesis 
certainly are different in substance, approach, and style. On the other hand, several of the main 
ideas which have guided my research in the past four years return throughout the thesis. First, 
the idea of autonomy in law and legal reasoning as a key characteristic of the behaviour of 
legal systems.1 Second, the idea of legality as a property which normative systems can possess,2 
but at the same time an ideal for normative systems which already possess that property – i.e. 
legal systems – to live up to.3 Third, the idea of pluralism as a value which is both inevitable 
in legal and moral reasoning4 and something whose existence is precisely denied by legal 
systems in their theoretical self-understanding5 as well as their practical operation.6  
Echoing the introduction to this dissertation, it would be foolish to claim that this 
dissertation comes even remotely close to a fully developed ‘theory’ of either autonomy, 
legality or pluralism in the context of European law or the EU legal system. Perhaps for the 
better if one may believe – as I do – that a four-year time frame is only just enough to develop 
																																																						
1 See ‘Why EU Law Claims Supremacy’, Chapter 2; and ‘Legality and Autonomy of EU Law: You’d Better 
Believe It’, Chapter 3; and as applied to substantive EU law, ‘Interpreting the EU Internal Market’, Chapter 4. 
2 ‘Why EU Law Claims Supremacy’, Chapter 2; and ‘Legality and Autonomy of EU Law: You’d Better Believe 
It’, Chapter 3. 
3 For the notion of Fullerian legality, see the Introduction, Chapter 1; and ‘Legality and Autonomy of EU Law: 
You’d Better Believe It’, Chapter 3. As applied to the discussion on the limits of the direct effect of directives, 
see ‘The Normative Impact of Invoking Directives: Casting Light on Direct Effect and the Elusive Distinction 
between Obligations and Mere Adverse Repercussions’, Chapter 5. 
4 ‘In Search of Foundations: Ethics and Metaethics in Constitutional Adjudication’, Chapter 6. For a practical 
application, see ‘Breaking Chinese Law – Making European One: The Story of Chen, Or: Two Winners, Two 
Losers, Two Truths’, Chapter 8. 
5 ‘Why EU Law Claims Supremacy’, Chapter 2; and ‘Legality and Autonomy of EU Law: You’d Better Believe 
It’, Chapter 3. 
6 ‘Pluralism Through Its Denial: The Success of EU Citizenship’, Chapter 7. 
a rough idea of a research programme.7 In this concluding chapter, I will very briefly revisit 
the main theses of the three parts of this dissertation. 
 
Part I 
EU law is an autonomous legal system. This is something which literally every student of EU 
law knows. It may seem too trivial to be worthy of any further scrutiny. Perhaps it is. However, 
inquiries into the nature of the EU legal system have long struggled with the question of how 
we should understand the ECJ’s claims of autonomy, direct effect and supremacy, and 
implicated questions such as how supranational authority relates to familiar notions like 
sovereignty, constituent power and legitimacy.  
Chapters 2 and 3 are based on the premise that we can separate – at least as a matter of 
theoretical inquiry – questions about the structure and functioning of a legal system from 
questions about its political nature, its legitimacy and its intricate factual interactions with other 
legal systems. The EU legal system can indeed be described, accurately, I submit, as an 
autonomous legal system which behaves exactly like domestic legal systems. Put differently, 
while the politics of European integration and the structural relationships in the federal 
European structure frequently – and understandably – take centre stage in theoretical and 
practical analysis, the EU legal system remains largely unconcerned with such issues. As a 
legal system, it is self-referential and autopoietic, and unconcerned with its structural 
interactions with national and international legal systems. 
As Chapter 2 showed, the doctrine of supremacy of EU law, as articulated among others 
in Costa/ENEL,8 Simmenthal,9 and Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR,10 captures a 
truism about our concept of law: law always claims comprehensive supremacy over all other 
normative systems. Legal systems are self-centred and frequently idealise themselves 
considerably more than seems warranted.11 This is true both for national legal systems – with 
																																																						
7 By ‘research programme’ I mean an at least marginally coherent idea for future research in the medium- to long-
term. Obviously, I do not mean to refer to the idea of ‘(scientific) research programme’ in Lakatos’ philosophy of 
science. 
8 Flaminio Costa v ENEL, 6/64, EU:C:1964:66, 
9 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA, 106/77, EU:C:1978:49. 
10 Opinion 2/13 on accession of the EU to the ECHR, EU:C:2014:2454. 
11 Or, as I tried to capture this in Chapter 2 by quoting the late John Gardner, legal systems are ‘pretentious and 
rife with an inflated sense of its own importance’. 
their excessive confidence in the perpetuity of their authority and legitimacy12 – and the EU 
legal system – with its own excessive confidence in its messianic purposes.13  
Obviously, legal systems interact with other legal systems as well as numerous other, non-
legal normative systems. As Joseph Raz demonstrated pellucidly, however, the process of 
adopting norms from other normative systems by giving them binding effect does not affect 
legal systems’ claims of normative supremacy within their own jurisdictions.14 This certainly 
is true for the EU legal system, which has let itself be influenced by domestic as well as 
international legal spheres throughout its history, but without ever compromising ultimate 
authority within its jurisdiction.15 
The relationship between autonomy, legality and effectiveness is further discussed in 
Chapter 3. The main argument pervading EU law’s claims of autonomy and supremacy has 
always been the argument from effectiveness.16 In Chapter 3, the ECJ’s foundational case law 
on direct effect and supremacy is reconstructed as an internal recognitional statement by which 
the ECJ expresses a normative formulation of an autonomous EU rule of recognition.17 In 
declaring the autonomy of the EU legal system, the ECJ does not describe the manner in which 
EU law is an autonomous legal system, dissociated from both domestic and international law, 
but pitches its normative formulation of an autonomous EU rule of recognition towards the 
national courts.18 This is not in any way different from how legal systems generally come into 
existence.19 
The chapters of part I rely on a particularly narrow theoretical framework, that is, the 
contemporary Anglo-American tradition of general jurisprudence. Indeed, it is submitted that 
the work of Hart, Raz, Coleman, Shapiro, Toh, and others, can contribute significantly to our 
understanding of supranational and transnational legal systems. However, of course this 
																																																						
12 A. Somek, ‘The Spirit of Legal Positivism’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 729, 734. 
13 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘In the Face of Crisis: Input Legitimacy, Output Legitimacy and the Political Messianism of 
European Integration’ (2012) 34 Journal of European Integration 825. See also, as applied to holistic 
interpretation, ‘Interpreting the EU Internal Market’, Chapter 4, section V. 
14 See J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Clarendon Press 1975) 149–154; ‘Why EU Law Claims Supremacy’, 
Chapter 2, section III. 
15 ‘Why EU Law Claims Supremacy’, Chapter 2, section III.D. 
16 ‘Legality and Autonomy of EU Law: You’d Better Believe It’, Chapter 3, section III. 
17 Ibid. section IV. 
18 Ibid.  section IV.B. 
19 Ibid. sections IV and VI. On H.L.A. Hart’s magnificent ‘fable’ of how the legal system can emerge, see The 
Concept of Law, 3rd edn (Oxford University Press 2012) ch. 5. 
framework, like any other, offers only a limited vantage point. One should be careful not falling 
victim to the idea that one particular perspective on law can claim an epistemic monopoly. 
More specifically, against the background of the (quasi-)universal claims of contemporary 
analytical jurisprudence one should be cautious in order not to become a parody of an analytical 
philosopher. This is precisely what a young William Twining found out when he, as a young 
graduate student at the University of Chicago, first met Karl Llewellyn. As Twining recalls, 
Llewellyn was quick in his diagnosis of the young jurisprudent: 
 
‘I was suffering from “Korzybskian paralysis”; I had found a bright new tool – conceptual 
analysis – and was now obsessed by it and over-using it’.20 
 
To be fair, Twining admits the learned professor was probably right: 
 
‘I considered myself rather sophisticated, even if I seemed to be caught in an endless 
regress, asking in sequence what do you mean by that? What do you mean by that? That? 
That?’21 
 
The foundations of the EU legal system have mainly been studied from constitutional law and 
political science perspectives. For this reason, I believe the perspective from analytical 
jurisprudence offers a refreshing, demystified, and less romantic image of the provenance and 
functioning of the EU legal system. There is, of course, much more to say about the foundations 
and operation of EU law as a normatively closed social system, from descriptive perspectives 
such as legal sociology and the many non-Anglo-American worlds of general jurisprudence, 
among others, and also from the perspective of ethical and other normative evaluation. 
Conceptual analysis in legal theory certainly is not all there is. However, it does have important 
insights to offer, precisely because it aims to abstract entirely from contingent characteristics 
of law, even though it usually fails in its inspirations.22 In other words, even if Hart and Raz’s 
																																																						
20 W. Twining, Jurist in Context: A Memoir (Cambridge University Press 2019) 35. 
21 Ibid. 34. 
22 One could refer to Hershovitz’ wisdom on the attempts of legal philosophers to find ‘universal truths’ about 
law: ‘Legal theorists like to do a lot with a little too, but their track record is decidedly less impressive. John 
Austin, for example, thought that he could capture the nature of law in a simple slogan: law is the command of 
the sovereign. H.L.A. Hart showed that Austin’s theory was too simple. Among other problems, some laws are 
not commands, and some legal systems do not have sovereigns, at least in Austin’s sense. But Hart had a simple 
theories of law were to be proved entirely mistaken in terms of their universal aspirations, we 
would still be able to learn a lot from them about the EU legal system.23 
 
Part II 
The two chapters of part II emphasise the roles of respectively autonomy (Chapter 4) and 
legality (Chapter 5) in two separate fields of EU substantive law. The autonomy of EU legal 
system implies that difficult conundrums about the relationship between regulatory freedom 
and the effet utile of the internal market, and the competence division between the EU and the 
Member States, are primarily interpretive questions which have to be answered by EU law 
itself. Alas, EU law is mainly known by ECJ decision, and so the incremental process of 
building the substantive content of EU law – ‘stone by stone’ as it were24 – means that much 
of the law has remained elusive for a long time. In the context of EU internal market law, the 
ECJ is unwilling to put much effort into operationalising the foundational objectives and basic 
principles into clear categories of legal form.25 Rather, each judgment reads as a 
‘circumloquacious statement of the result, rather than a reason for arriving at it’, to use 
Weatherill’s words.26 Proportionality and reasonableness take centre stage in the case law on 
free movement, shifting emphasis to pragmatic and case-by-case judicial decision-making. 
What it means exactly to apply the free movement provisions ‘reasonably’ cannot be found in 
either the ECJ’s definition of a trade barrier,27 the allocation of the burden of proof and the 
required standard of proof,28 or the extent to which the free movement rules are, or should be, 
																																																						
theory of his own: a legal system is a union of primary and secondary rules. Alas, Hart’s theory was too simple 
too. It didn’t distinguish law from other systems with primary and secondary rules (chess, for example, or a 
university’s regulations). And there are reasons to doubt that rules are the fundamental building blocks of law, or 
that law even has fundamental building blocks at all […] But doom does not entail gloom: you can learn a lot 
from reading Austin and Hart, even though you cannot learn what law is’. S. Hershovitz, ‘The Search for a Grand 
Unified Theory of Tort Law’ (2017) 130 Harvard Law Review 942, 942–943. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Cf. K. Lenaerts, ‘EU Citizenship and the European Court of Justice’s “Stone-by-Stone” Approach’ (2015) 1 
International Comparative Jurisprudence 1. 
25 See ‘Interpreting the EU Internal Market’, Chapter 4, section II. 
26 S. Weatherill, ‘The Court’s Case Law on the Internal Market: “A Circumloquacious Statement of the Result, 
Rather than a Reason for Arriving at It”?’ in M. Adams et al. (eds.), Judging Europe’s Judges (Hart Publishing 
2013). 
27 ‘Interpreting the EU Internal Market’, Chapter 4, section III. 
28 Ibid. section IV. 
interpreted holistically.29 While from an external perspective, the meaning and implications of 
economic integration are not undisputed,30 the Treaties neither provide for clear-cut political 
or economic choices.31 The result is a pervasive reliance on reasonableness, pragmatism and 
common sense – which certainly has its own virtues – but little doctrinal clarity to such an 
extent that a truly unitary framework for the free movement provisions is probably an illusion.32 
Alas, that is the price to pay for a strict commitment to autonomy, which entails that the 
meaning and content of EU internal market law is only known through the ECJ’s judicial 
minimalism.33 
However, EU doctrinal constructivism is not dead. While I do believe that scepticism as 
to the ability to find a watertight theory of EU internal market law is warranted, the case of 
direct effect of directives proves that all hope is never lost. Legality’s adventures in the ECJ’s 
case law on the limited direct effect of directives – informed primarily by the hermeneutic 
implications of Article 288 TFEU – have caused longstanding puzzlement in academic 
commentary. Notwithstanding the vast literature in the late 1990s and early 2000s, doctrine 
seemed incapable of finding a doctrinal explanation of the Court’s meanderings on vertical, 
inverse vertical, horizontal, triangular and incidental effects of directives.34 In Chapter 5, 
however, Lorenzo Squintani and I tried to show how the distinction between direct obligations 
and mere adverse repercussions, and correspondingly the notion of ‘normative impact’, 
informs the Court’s case law in a consistent and predictable manner.  
This does not necessarily mean, of course, that the normative impact theory is also the 
normatively optimal or preferred manner of balancing legality against invocability and 
																																																						
29 Ibid. section V. 
30 For a proposal to update the present conception of economic integration in the context of the EU internal market, 
see I. Lianos, ‘Updating the EU Internal Market Concept’ in F. Amtenbrink et al. (eds.), The Internal Market and 
the Future of European Integration: Essays in Honour of Laurence W. Gormley (Cambridge University Press 
2019). 
31 ‘Interpreting the EU Internal Market’, Chapter 4, section V. See for a detailed analysis C. Kaupa, The Pluralist 
Character of the European Economic Constitution (Hart Publishing 2016). 
32 See also S. Weatherill, ‘The Several Internal Markets’ (2017) 36 Yearbook of European Law 125. 
33 ‘Interpreting the EU Internal Market’, Chapter 4, section VI. For a critical view on the implications for legality, 
see A. Somek, ‘Is Legality a Principle of EU Law?’ in S. Vogenauer and S. Weatherill (eds.), General Principles 
of Law. European and Comparative Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2017). 
34 See ‘The Normative Impact of Invoking Directives: Casting Light on Direct Effect and the Elusive Distinction 
between Obligations and Mere Adverse Repercussions’, Chapter 5, section II. 
effectiveness. It might be that a Hohfeldian framework of analysis35 or an exclusive focus on 
personal and material scope36 would ultimately be more sustainable from a moral or otherwise 
evaluative perspective. Nevertheless, legal analysis is destined to always mesh moral and social 
(i.e. empirical) factors, and so any doctrinal theory must be based in part on the available 
positive materials, in particular the case law. The Court’s conception of legality as a principle 
of positive law, as manifested in the case law on direct effect, seems accurately grasped by our 
theory of normative impact.37 
 
Part III 
The chapters of Part III of this dissertation have focused on different notions of morality and 
pluralism in jurisprudence, with particular emphasis to the EU citizenship case law. Together, 
these chapters emphasise the moral importance of pluralism in constitutional adjudication: 
pluralism in moral and legal reasoning is more likely to result in morally justified outcomes. 
This type of substantive pluralism should not be mistaken for the type of analytical pluralism 
which is precisely absent in the functioning and self-understanding of legal systems. Even 
though legal systems are self-referential and anti-pluralistic in their formal operation, the 
sources of moral content, which each legal system adopts in the processes of legal 
interpretation, are usually profoundly pluralistic.  
Chapter 6 showed how attempts to reduce the moral informants of constitutional 
adjudication to monolithic and self-standing ideal-types is most likely a dead end.38 This should 
be unsurprising if one believes – as I do – that morality itself is pluralistic in the sense that no 
source of moral belief can claim to exhaustive of moral fact. Individuals, groups and entire 
societies can have very different and yet equally legitimate ethical commitments.39 Notions 
such as ‘constitutional identity’, ‘common sentiment’ and ‘universal reason’ (and one may add 
many more potential candidates) surely are ‘suppliers’ of moral value, but none of them can 
claim a particular metaethical prerogative.  
Notwithstanding the plural nature of metaethics, in relation to both the naturalistic world 
as well as the socially constructed universe of law and legal system morality is autonomous in 
																																																						
35 Ibid. sections II.A and IV.A. 
36 Ibid. sections II.B and IV.B. 
37 Ibid. sections V and VI. 
38 See the discussion in ‘In Search of Foundations: Ethics and Metaethics in Constitutional Adjudication’, Chapter 
6, ‘Three Types of Ethical Argument’. 
39 See generally I. Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (Pimlico 2003). 
its own right: it contains its own internal standards of justification and criticism.40 This means 
that legal systems as a whole, as well as judicial judgments in themselves, can and should be 
morally appraisable.41  
The moral virtues of the autonomy and plurality of legal systems are illustrated by 
reference to the derivative nature of EU citizenship in Chapter 7. On the one hand, EU 
citizenship is an autonomous status of the citizens of the Member States. On the other hand, 
the acquisition of that status is an autonomous competence of the Member States. The result is 
a remarkable type of pluralism through its denial. The plurality of roads towards becoming an 
EU citizen are maintained precisely because Member States are unlikely to give up their 
sovereign right to determine who their nationals are.42 This autonomy of the Member States 
thus has a particular moral value towards the individual, in the sense that access to EU 
citizenship is inherently pluralistic.43  
The practical implication of the plural acquisition of EU citizenship – and in particular, its 
moral virtue – is shown by the case of Zhu and Chen. One out of many roads towards EU 
citizenship offered Mrs Chen and her unborn baby a way out of China and its one-child-policy: 
a remarkable interaction between pluralism and autonomy. Further, in its judgment the ECJ 
makes perfectly clear that our ethical opinions about Mrs Chen’s intentions and behaviour is 
irrelevant to the law. Even if we consider Mrs Chen a ‘bad woman’,44 her compliance with 
Irish and EU law is sufficient for Catherine’s acquisition of EU citizenship and her own 
acquisition of a ‘derivative right of residence’. Thus, the Zhu and Chen case shows how 
Kantian legality – even though ordinarily contrasted with morality – has important moral 
virtues in itself. The background story of Zhu and Chen portrays the morality of autonomy and 
pluralism in EU citizenship law at the very micro-level.45 It is the natural corollary of Chapter 
7’s discussion of the very same themes at the abstract macro-level of legal systems as such. 
 
																																																						
40 See also ‘In Search of Foundations: Ethics and Metaethics in Constitutional Adjudication’, Chapter 6, 
‘Confidence and Reflection as Metaethical Theory’ and ‘Concluding Remarks’.  
41 For some preliminary observations on the distinction between positivist and non-positivist conceptions of the 
systematicity of legal systems, see also ‘Why EU Law Claims Supremacy’, Chapter 2, sections II and III.  
42 ‘Pluralism Through its Denial: The Success of EU Citizenship’, Chapter 7, sections III and IV. 
43 Ibid. sections V and VI. 
44 Cf. Holmes’ ‘bad man’, in O.W. Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457. 
45 ‘Breaking Chinese Law – Making European One: The Story of Chen, Or: Two Winners, Two Losers, Two 
Truths’, Chapter 8, sections I and V. 
Final remarks and the road ahead 
Some final remarks about the underlying premises of many of the chapters of this dissertation, 
in particular those in part I. Legal scholarship, like interpretation as such, ‘follows the law of 
acoustics: “angle of incidence equates angle of reflection”’.46 As there are many more questions 
to be asked, and answers to be given, regarding the autonomy and legality of EU law, as well 
as the dual role of pluralism – limited in legality’s self-understanding, but pervasive in the 
law’s informants – hopefully the chapters of this dissertation have contributed – marginally 
and incrementally at least – to some of the salient aspects of these themes.  
The key premise of all chapters to this dissertation, and Chapters 2 and 3 in particular, is 
that we can learn a lot about the EU legal system by describing it in its own terms. By contrast, 
most scholarship on EU constitutional theory and law has focused on issues such as the 
confederal or federal nature of the European legal architecture, its proper qualification as 
‘international’, ‘supranational’ or ‘federal’ law, and connections between legality, polity and 
moral and political legitimacy. This is where contributions to the philosophy of law in general 
show their explanatory power towards many characteristics of EU law which could otherwise 
remain obscure, such as its comprehensive claim to supremacy, and its normative commitment 
to the autonomy of the EU legal system and its rule of recognition. A strict conception of EU 
law as an autonomous legal system also sheds a different light on more pragmatic questions 
such as the ambit of the free movement provisions – unconcerned with anything like a 
‘regulatory autonomy’ of the Member States – or the limits to the direct effect of directives – 
entirely based on the hermeneutics of EU law’s principle of legality.  
EU law interacts with national law, just as it interacts with morality and other normative 
systems. This does not, however, mean that EU law forces us to develop a theory of law which 
is based on normative hierarchy between legal systems or one-system theories of law which 
stipulate that law and morality are inseparable. The manner in which the EU legal system 
interacts with other normative systems reveals, if anything, the explanatory power of theories 
of law which emphasise law’s self-referentiality and, by implication, its ‘inflated sense of its 
own importance’. The insights of H.L.A. Hart, Joseph Raz, and their followers, provide an 
image of legal systems which is less romantic and less mystical than many non-positivist 
																																																						
46 R.G.P. Peters, ‘Constitutional Interpretation: A View from a Distance’ (2011) 50 History and Theory 117, 135, 
inspired by R.G. Collingwood’s method of ‘question and answer’. I might add here that Collingwood’s method 
of question and answer is only one of the many refined insights which Rik Peters taught me during his course on 
Theory of History and his subsequent supervision of my BA thesis in the 2012–2013 academic year.  
theories of law as well as recent contributions to legal pluralism and constitutional pluralism. 
However, the demystification of law certainly has its own explanatory virtues. While the EU 
legal system can be, and should be, morally evaluated, understanding its nature and functioning 
requires at least in part a detailed analysis of its self-understanding. EU law does not care 
whether it is a federation, a confederation, supranational, international, or sui generis. In its 
own perception, EU law is a legal system, and that is all that matters.  
Karl Llewellyn’s wise diagnosis of the young William Twining’s obsession in mind, 
‘Hartian paralysis’ is of course no better than ‘Korzybskian paralysis’, and so it should be 
readily acknowledged that the themes of this dissertation can be elucidated from numerous 
other ‘views of the cathedral’ as well.  
Building upon the findings of this dissertation, future research into the role of autonomy, 
legality and pluralism in European law would have to further scrutinise the behaviour of the 
EU legal system and the interactions between the EU legal system and national legal systems, 
but also between the EU legal system and international law and its numerous (partly) self-
constitutionalised legal regimes such as the ECHR and the WTO. Beyond the attempts of Hart 
and others to elucidate the non-contingent nature and functioning of legal systems, this future 
research would also have focus on the sociology of legal systems and legal officials. Various 
perspectives from contemporary legal sociology and sociology in general could complement, 
or even contest, the findings of this dissertation insofar as they are informed by the more 
abstract legal-theoretical literature. Indeed, contemporary legal philosophy has been adapting 
to changes in the contingent characteristics of what we call ‘law’, as expressed for instance by 
the increasing focus on transnational legal theory, relative and overlapping legal authority, and 
constitutionalism beyond the state. A more informed theory of EU law which has explanatory 
power towards the legal phenomena as we perceive them requires all insights which legal 
sociology has to offer, not only with a view to legal systems and the role of the judiciary in 
general but also with a view to the notion of ‘legal reasoning’ as a specific form of practical 
reasoning. 
In addition, future research on the autonomy and legality of EU law as well as the role of 
pluralism (in all of its manifestations) in EU law specifically and the European legal space 
more generally, would have to focus more on the role of interpretation and hermeneutics and 
its relationship to the concept and sociology of law. The lengthy debate on the connection – or 
absence thereof – between conceptions of law such as positivism and non-positivism on the 
one hand, and certain methods of legal interpretation on the other hand, could serve as a viable 
starting point for analysis of, for example, the relationship between the conception of the EU 
legal system and the interpretation and understanding of EU law. However, hermeneutics and 
theories of interpretation (and the ‘internal point of view’ more generally) are likely to have a 
more significant and broader role as well in future research into the nature and functioning of 
European law. The relationships and interconnections between the various (quasi-)autonomous 
legal systems of the European legal space are constantly shaped by the legal officials’ 
understanding of both their position and role in the legal system (i.e. their self-conception) and 
their object of analysis (i.e. the norms of the legal system as such and their source of validity). 
While the constant interpretative interaction between norms from different legal systems (for 
instance in the context of interpretation of national law in light of EU law and the doctrine of 
indirect effect) may lead one to believe that the idea of (autonomous) legal systems is obsolete, 
perhaps a more refined notion of the interactions between legal systems – not only at the level 
of the systems as such but also at the level of individual norms – is needed to improve our 
understanding of the functioning of (concurrent and overlapping) legal systems. 
These two perspectives – the sociology of legal systems, legal officials and legal 
reasoning, and theories of hermeneutics and interpretation – have been only marginally 
included in the chapters of this dissertation indeed. And I readily acknowledge, once more, that 
the theoretical framework which has informed this dissertation has substantial but incomplete 
explanatory power towards the complexity and richness of EU legal system’s behaviour. 
Insofar as one may diagnose this dissertation as suffering from a fair degree of Hartian, Razian 
and Dworkinian paralysis, I would certainly not question this diagnosis. However, the choice 
for the perspective to be taken and the questions to be asked is surely a matter of ‘le bon sens’,47 
to speak with Pierre Duhem once more. It is submitted, therefore, that in view of the nature, 
characteristics, and functioning of EU law, the seminal work of Hart and other jurists of the 




47 P. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, trans. P.P. Wiener (Atheneum 1962 [1904–1905]) 217, 
247, cited in D. Gillies, ‘The Duhem Thesis and the Quine Thesis’ reprinted in M. Curd, J.A. Cover and C. Pincock 
(eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, 2nd edn (W.W. Norton & Company 2013) 278. 

